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Institutional Stimulation of Deliberative
Decision-Making: Division of Labour,
Deliberative Legitimacy and Technical






Institutions stimulate deliberative decision-making if they hinder stakeholders from
introducing bargaining power into the decision process. This article explores the
conditions for, and limits of, the creation of deliberative legitimacy in single market
regulation. An assessment of the standardization procedure demonstrates that legiti-
macy arises only from the combination of political and technical deliberation.
Introduction
It is widely agreed that the European Union suffers from a severe democratic
deficit (Follesdal and Hix, 2006; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2007). Public
participation and control through elections is still grossly underdeveloped.
Parliamentary influence and the government-opposition nexus are much
weaker than in domestic political systems (Hix et al., 2005). Unfortunately,
adjustment of these deficits might imply a de facto transformation of the
current post-national entity into a European federal state.
The democratic deficit assumption is challenged by the literature on
deliberation and on regulation. It is increasingly argued that new modes of
governance stimulate deliberation among decision-makers and/or within the
wider public. Deliberation creates a specific form of non-majoritarian legiti-
macy that is based on persuasion and the exchange of convincing arguments
(Habermas, 1998; Risse, 2000). It may provide a mechanism to democratize
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the European polity short of its transformation into a regular democratic
state (De la Porte and Nanz, 2004; Murphy, 2005). From a different angle,
Moravcsik (2002) observes that the EU fulfils functions which are usually
performed by administrations even in domestic political systems. And
Majone (2001; 1996, pp. 15–19) emphasizes that regulation, i.e. the primary
task of the EU, ought not to become subject to majoritarian decision-making
or bargaining, because regulation is about identifying problem-adequate
(‘efficient’) solutions, while majorities or powerful negotiators will, in the
first place, pursue their parochial interests. Accordingly, regulatory decisions
are best assigned to independent agencies.
The conceptual divide between the regulation and the deliberation per-
spectives is surprisingly narrow. They jointly emphasize that power-based
majoritarian decision-making and accommodation of preferences through
bargaining do not create legitimacy for regulatory decisions. Moreover, they
assume that options can be appraised according to criteria that are indepen-
dent from the preferences of powerful majorities or negotiators. Whereas
regulation theory focuses on the quality of outputs and searches for proce-
dures that promise such regulation, deliberation provides a procedure that
produces not only legitimate, but also particularly well-reasoned decisions.
Regulation by way of deliberation may be more acceptable to those political
actors of the EU (in particular the Member States and the Parliament) that
are only rarely prepared to assign full decision-making powers to indepen-
dent agencies (Follesdal and Hix, 2006, pp. 551–7; Lord and Beetham,
2001).
While the normative literature lacks an empirical theory of how delibera-
tive ideals might plausibly be institutionalized in the European arena (Lord
and Magnette, 2004, pp. 195–6), authors have begun to explore how real-
world actors within the European polity can be effectively induced to adopt
binding decisions through deliberation. This means identifying institutional-
ized opportunity structures that drive actors systematically toward delibera-
tion, while discouraging power-based voting or bargaining. Joerges and
Neyer (1997) claimed that comitology committees transform ‘intergovern-
mental bargaining to deliberative political processes’ (recently restated by
Joerges, 2006). Some observers identify the European Parliament and the
Constitutional Convention as institutional arrangements that stimulate delib-
eration (Eriksen and Fossum, 2002). It has even been argued that the entire
EU polity has developed into a ‘heterarchy’ (Neyer, 2003, pp. 688–90), in
which decisions are jointly made by different centres of power so that the
bodies involved must persuade each other of their views in order to produce
jointly accepted decisions. This theoretical debate still almost entirely lacks
an empirical foundation.
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In the following, we offer the blueprint of an institutional arrangement that
promises to stimulate deliberative decision-making, thereby producing legiti-
mate and problem-adequate regulatory decisions. It relies on the systematic
separation of decision functions and their assignment to different actors.
Conventional wisdom has attributed deliberation-conducive effects largely to
the skilful design of specific forums, such as committees or the European
Parliament. We demonstrate that this perspective doesn’t reach far enough, be-
cause important incentives for deliberative decision-making emerge from the
specific arrangements that divide labour among the decision-making bodies
involved. Such arrangements assign important functions to the powerful politi-
cal actors of the Union, especially the Council and the Parliament, and simulta-
neously draw on the expertise of other stakeholders and the wider European
public. They hinder all actors involved from effectively pursuing their paro-
chial interests. Such arrangements mobilize ‘democratic legitimacy’ originat-
ing from the influence of the Council and the Parliament and at the same time
‘technocratic legitimacy’ that depends on rational expert deliberation.
We find such an arrangement in several policy areas of single market
regulation, but specific conditions must be fulfilled in order to ensure that
decision-makers do not resort to their bargaining or voting power to pursue
their specific interests. The core idea of the ‘New Approach’ envisages that
the political actors (Commission, Council, and Parliament) define general
regulatory standards for larger groups of products or services according to the
regular legislative procedures, while more specific rules and case-specific
application decisions are assigned to expert bodies embedded within multi-
step decision procedures. While this form of vertical and horizontal division
of labour is increasingly employed for single market regulation, the prototype
is the technical regulation of products according to the standardization pro-
cedure. Only a careful analysis of regulatory activities elucidates whether
deliberative regulation is actually achieved. For this purpose, we compare the
regulation of two large product groups, namely machinery and toys. It turns
out that standardization under the Machinery Directive fulfils the promises of
deliberation entirely, while decision-making under the Toys Safety Directive
creates some severe legitimacy gaps. This difference is attributed to the partial
failure of the political actors to establish, in the toys case, an effective system
of divided labour between the two decision-making levels involved.
I. Deliberative Decision-Making
The narrow concept of arguing elucidates the theoretical core of deliberation.
It is in contrast to the surprisingly weak concept of deliberation employed by
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most of the literature that focuses on public debate, but it is silent as to the
actual influence of deliberation on the final decisions produced. Arguing is
diametrically opposed to power-based bargaining and reflects the ‘pure’
co-ordination logic of deliberation (Neyer, 2003, pp. 690–6).
The Normative Superiority of Deliberation (Arguing) over Bargaining
Bargaining constitutes the baseline of collective decision-making in negotia-
tions. It is well-known from rational choice theory and reflects strategic action
by rational utility maximizers in communicative processes. Despite their
common interest in reaching agreement, actors typically have competing
interests regarding the distribution of co-operation gains (Scharpf, 1997, pp.
118–24). In order to maximize their return, bargaining actors rely on threats
and promises that have to be executed outside the assembly itself. Credibility
increases with the attractiveness of an actor’s ‘best available alternative to
agreement’. Accordingly, the outcome of a bargaining process, i.e. the distri-
bution of gains, can be expected to reflect, by and large, the distribution of
power among the actors involved (Elster, 1989, pp. 74–82). If decisions may
be adopted by a majority, bargaining may stop short of consensus.
Bargaining does not ensure that the most problem-adequate or the collec-
tively most legitimate solutions are identified. Outcomes will improve Pareto-
efficiency, because they promise some co-operation gains for all involved
parties compared to the status quo. However, they may be extremely one-
sided or problem-inadequate, because they are based upon the status quo and
the existing distribution of power among the involved actors. Moreover, any
outcome is equally legitimate, because legitimacy rests solely on its voluntary
acceptance by the negotiators. Accordingly, legitimacy dwindles as soon as
the underlying distribution of power changes significantly.
The communication mode of arguing is diametrically opposed to bargain-
ing. Adapted from Habermasian discourse theory (Habermas, 1984), it is
exclusively based on convincing reasons. In an arguing process, competing
validity claims are appraised and judged against commonly accepted criteria
(Gehring, 2003). Propositions must be accompanied by reasons which refer
to commonly accepted criteria. Arguing is a triadic process that involves
two separate steps. First, general criteria are collectively identified; second, a
specific dispute is explored, and finally decided, in light of these criteria.
Hence, convincing reasons are the sole resource in deliberation processes.
Co-ordination in the mode of arguing is more demanding than
co-ordination through bargaining. It requires that the participants presuppose
an ‘ideal speech situation’ (Risse, 2000, p. 10). They must abstain from
resorting to power resources available outside the negotiations, because
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arguments are simply not convincing if only based on power. In practice,
participants must at least assume that the power resources associated with a
speaker do not invalidate the arguments that he or she submits. In addition,
reasons do not matter unless actors are prepared to question, and possibly
revise, their perspectives on the disputed subjects in light of new arguments.
Collective decisions reached by arguing are ‘rational’ in the Habermasian
sense. They are better reasoned, and thus more convincing, than any of the
original claims, because they have been collectively examined and approved.
Likewise, they are not distorted by the struggle over the allocation of costs
and benefits and by the prevailing distribution of power among the partici-
pants. The emerging solution is in this regard ‘better’ than that of decisions
emerging from bargaining processes, and it approaches the ideal of ‘good
governance’ (Joerges, 1999; Neyer, 2003, pp. 696–702). It does not matter
whether it is in conformity with anybody’s parochial interests. This is true
also for a discourse on the normative rightness of propositions, because, in
such discourses, actors are able to claim convincingly only what is generally
acceptable by all those affected if they disregard their parochial interests and
stakes. Arguments that are largely rooted in their own parochial interests are
not convincing (Eriksen and Weigård, 1997, p. 229).
Remarkably, the legitimacy-creating effect of deliberation (arguing) is not
immediately related to transparency of a discourse, or to the participation of
all those possibly affected. It suffices that actors can no longer contest the
validity of a discursively reached social norm with convincing reasons. Con-
trary to much of the normatively oriented (Cohen and Sabel, 1997) and some
of the analytical literature on the subject (Elster, 1998; Eriksen and Fossum,
2002), arguing may well be employed behind closed doors, for example, by
a group of experts. Legitimacy arises from the sincere consideration of all
relevant arguments. The whole concept of communicative action would
become entirely utopian for political processes if it required general partici-
pation of all those possibly affected. Accordingly, Habermas (1998, p. 107)
infers from the discourse principle that ‘just those action norms are valid to
which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational
discourses’ (emphasis added).
Institutional Incentives for Deliberative Problem-Solving
The theoretical exploration of deliberation-inducing institutional opportunity
structures should set out from a conception that does not assume that actors
will be prepared to sacrifice the pursuit of their parochial interests if com-
municative understanding so requires. Unfortunately, deliberation does not
elucidate the conditions under which a discourse may become operative
INSTITUTIONAL STIMULATION OF DELIBERATIVE DECISION-MAKING 1005
© 2008 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
among real-world actors. Collective decision-making through arguing among
real-world actors is widely considered as all too idealistic, if not as entirely
utopian, because even powerful actors have to refrain from introducing their
power resources into the decision process and have to accept even well-
reasoned results that are not (fully) compatible with their parochial interests.
Jon Elster (1998) was among the first to point out that rational utility maxi-
mizers may, under certain circumstances, resort to an exchange and common
appraisal of rational arguments. He suggested that transparency and public
observation of political decision processes make it costly, or even impossible,
for decision-makers to pursue parochial interests openly that deviate signifi-
cantly from the common good. In contrast, Habermas (1984, pp. 285–6) and
several authors drawing on the theory of communicative action (Risse, 2000)
assume that communicative action requires actors not to behave as strategic
utility maximizers. Likewise, Joerges and Neyer originally attributed com-
mittee deliberation partly to the socialization of committee members (Joerges
and Neyer, 1997).
Even simple negotiations, in which the participants make all decisions
themselves, provide limited room for deliberative decision-making, but they
do not create any institutional incentive to modify interaction in favour of
arguing. Discursive interaction among state representatives may contribute to
elucidating the circumstances upon which preferences are founded (Risse,
2000). However, assuming that powerful actors would systematically refrain
from influencing the choice of regulatory decisions by way of their power
resources once circumstances have been clarified, and once preferences have
been adjusted accordingly, would be all too altruistic (Elgström and Jönsson,
2000). Hence, simple negotiation processes do not create particular incentives
for deliberation.
The separation of specific decision functions may systematically deprive
the participating actors of their opportunities to influence the decision-
making process through bargaining. A discourse comprises two different
decision stages, namely the elaboration of general (abstract) criteria and the
settlement of disputes in light of these criteria. If these tasks are assigned to
different forums, each of these forums will concentrate on a subset of the
entire decision load. This relatively simple form of vertical differentiation of
a decision process dramatically changes the decision-making rationales of the
actors involved at both levels.
Specialization on the elaboration of abstract decision criteria facilitates
arguing because it tends to prevent actors from pursuing case-specific paro-
chial interests. Elaboration of decision criteria is the more general task.
Compared to a simple negotiation round, the decision situation changes in
two respects. First, actors are forced to be consistent across cases. Since their
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task is limited to producing abstract standards which can be implemented by
other actors, they are deprived of their opportunity to bargain over case-
specific deals (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985, pp. 28–31). Even when attempt-
ing to calculate their overall interest across cases, parties will be forced to
formulate a ‘median preference’ which can be transformed into coherent
principles. Second, actors may have to decide on general criteria before
becoming aware of their future case-specific preferences. Under this Rawl-
sian ‘veil of ignorance’ (Rawls, 1980, pp. 136–42), even rational utility
maximizers controlling power resources will struggle for criteria which
promise to produce acceptable decisions irrespective of their distributive
effects. The common search for such criteria and the evaluation of the con-
sequences of different options is a matter for discourse rather than bargaining.
Specialization on deciding single cases in light of existing decision criteria
facilitates arguing because criteria limit discretion and provide standards
against which decisions can be appraised. If the decisions are small and
sufficiently well separated from each other, so as to preclude their linkage
within explicitly negotiated packages, the typical patterns of committee gov-
ernance (Sartori, 1987, pp. 227–32) emerge. The distributive effect of the
single decision is usually asymmetrical and precludes a mutually acceptable
bargaining outcome. Actors pursuing their case-specific interests under such
conditions will inevitably jeopardize the entire co-operation project, to the
effect that actors seeking to realize co-operation gains must compromise. The
decision criteria provide a natural focal point that indicates in which decisions
to compromise. Committee governance will be especially prone to producing
criteria-based decisions if there are, besides the stakeholders, sufficient
parties without stakes in the particular decision, because these neutral parties
have no inherent interest in violating the criteria. Accordingly, arguments
supporting the proper application of mandatory decision criteria become a
powerful source of influence in the decision process.
The commitment to the sincere implementation of the decision criteria
will be reinforced through an additional horizontal differentiation of the
decision process. Typically, a regulatory decision consists of two compo-
nents: namely the appraisal of relevant facts; and the regulatory decision
made on the basis of this appraisal. The former is essentially concerned with
matters of truth. Institutions can reinforce deliberative decision-making on
matters of truth if they assign these issues to specialized forums (Gehring,
1999). Scientific and technological assessment panels establish a protected
niche for the deliberative validation of relevant matters of truth based upon
commonly shared standards for the appraisal of competing propositions. They
set the agenda for the ensuing political decision process, and they provide
standards for the appraisal of decisions (Krapohl, 2003). The commitment to
INSTITUTIONAL STIMULATION OF DELIBERATIVE DECISION-MAKING 1007
© 2008 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
the decision criteria will be further reinforced if the decision-making body is
made accountable to yet another entity. The criteria provide a standard against
which the decisions can be appraised. Institutionalization of the appraisal
function forces decision-makers to relate their decisions explicitly to the
criteria and thus provide convincing reasons (‘giving reasons requirement’,
Shapiro, 2002). In European single market regulation, virtually all decisions
are subject to potential scrutiny by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
The changed decision-making rationales emerge from the division of
labour among the sub-system involved; they are not rooted in the specificity
of any of these sub-systems. Decision-making systems that separate these
decision functions from each other and assign them to specialized decision
processes facilitate deliberative outcomes, because they systematically
reduce the ability of stakeholders to pursue their parochial interests by way of
power-based bargaining. If the stakeholders’ ability to bargain diminishes, or
if interventions in the bargaining mode do not significantly affect the resulting
regulatory decision, the most important obstacle to deliberative decision-
making disappears. Accordingly, institutionally created incentives for delib-
erative decision-making will disappear if institutional opportunity structures
do not readily deprive the actors of their ability to influence decisions through
bargaining. At the upper level, this will especially be the case if actors can
identify general preferences across cases. At the lower level it will apply if
decision-makers are not effectively bound to substantive decision criteria, be
it because such standards are absent or because accountability is too weak.
If this institutional arrangement creates sufficient incentives for delibera-
tive decision-making, it will mobilize different sorts of legitimacy. On the one
hand, it relies upon the political legitimacy of legislative decisions. Elabora-
tion of general decision criteria addresses the issue of how a given sector of
society ought to be regulated. This task is best performed by legislative actors
that are accountable to the general public and it may include public discourse.
Within the EU, it is basically a matter for the legislative procedures which
involve Commission, Council and Parliament. Deliberative decision-making
does not entirely rely on effective public scrutiny, because the above-
mentioned effects of functional specialization deprive the decision-makers –
as well as lobbyists and interest groups – at least partially of their bargaining
opportunities. On the other hand, the institutional arrangement mobilizes the
legitimacy-creating effects of expert discourse. Once it has been decided how
a given sector ought to be regulated, this general decision is implemented as
effectively and reasonably as possible, rather than through bargaining over
specific cases. This twin foundation of legitimate regulatory decision-making
is reflected in the Habermasian distinction between comparatively free politi-
cal deliberation (legislation) and state administration (implementation) which
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is closely bound to law and judicial control (Habermas, 1998, chapters 4
and 7).
II. The ‘New Approach’ to Single Market Regulation: Functional
Differentiation and the Promise of Deliberation
The institutional arrangement spelled out above is present in an increasing
number of areas of single market regulation. The regulation of foodstuffs and
the financial market, as well as the authorization of pharmaceuticals and the
standardization of health and safety requirements of products result from
decision-making at two separate levels. At the upper (political) level, the
legislative actors, namely Commission, Council and Parliament, adopt, after
consultation with interest groups, directives or regulations which spell out
both substantive decision criteria and the procedures for their application.
Application decisions are delegated to other bodies and the political actors
refrain from intervening in lower-level processes. Moreover, in all mentioned
areas of single market regulation, application decisions involve several
bodies. Lower-level decisions in the foodstuffs sector are prepared and
adopted by comitology committees, now upon guidance of a comparatively
weak European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) (Kelemen, 2002), while the
European Medical Evaluation Agency (EMEA) in fact dominates the autho-
rization of pharmaceuticals (Gehring and Krapohl, 2007), and financial
market regulation assigns an important role to a committee of competent
national regulatory agencies (Moloney, 2003). Evidently, these new forms of
regulation have been generally introduced to accelerate market integration
and remove stalemate within the Council, not to produce more legitimate
decisions.
The technical regulation of goods according to the ‘New Approach’ envis-
ages particularly far-reaching delegation of decision-making competencies to
private actors and may be conceived of as the prototype for functionally
differentiated single market regulation (Vos, 1999, pp. 268–80). It strictly
separates the elaboration of general health and safety requirements from their
detailed technical specification. The legislative actors are forced to concen-
trate on the elaboration of general rules applicable to large product groups
such as machinery or toys, rather than negotiating detailed provisions appli-
cable to small groups of products. Technical specifications are elaborated by
three privately organised European standardization organizations, namely
CEN, CENELEC and ETSI, composed of the standardization organizations
of the Member States (Vos, 1999, pp. 255–68). While European standards are
not legally binding, Member States must assume that products conforming to
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the standards’ requirements are also in conformity with the relevant directives
and accept marketing of such products within their jurisdictions. Accordingly,
Member States will seek to ensure that a directive’s actual requirements
guarantee an appropriate level of health and safety protection and that the
European standards actually conform to these requirements.
European standards are adopted in a multi-step procedure that assigns
functions to a number of bodies. First, a standardization project has to be
mandated by the Commission after consultation of the Committee on Stan-
dards and Technical Regulations. This advisory committee constitutes the
representation of the Member States. Second, standardization itself takes
place within the relevant standardization body without intervention from the
public actors. Third, a European standard adopted under the New Approach
must be registered by the European Commission after consultation of the
Committee on Standards. Fourth, a Member State doubting that a standard
ensures the health and safety requirements of the relevant directive can invoke
a safeguard procedure. After discussion, in the Committee on Standards, of
the reasons provided, the claim is finally decided upon by the Commission.
This decision is legally binding and may be brought before the European
Court of Justice.
The procedure is apparently designed to bind all involved actors firmly to
the legally binding criteria enshrined in the relevant directives. It draws on the
technical expertise of the privately organized standardization bodies and is
meant to ensure that they do not abuse their power. To preclude inter-
governmental bargaining, the Committee on Standards is limited to discus-
sion, while decisions are made by the Commission. The safeguard procedure
allows contesting a badly prepared standard, while hindering the Member
States from abusing their oversight rights. Finally, the Commission is not free
to decide at will, because it could have to justify its decisions before the ECJ.
The New Approach to technical harmonization is widely considered to be
a success. Without a doubt, it has achieved its major intention, namely
accelerating harmonization and speeding up market integration (Vos, 1999,
pp. 272–3). Today 23 directives, which cover wide product areas like
machinery, toys, elevators or medical products, are in force. Directives are
complemented by several hundred European standards.
However, it is an open question whether regulation according to the
standardization procedure keeps the promise of deliberative decision-making
and really mobilizes the twin pillars of legitimacy arising therefrom. Can
European citizens trust in the quality of such regulation? The fact that the
aforementioned ‘success’ is frequently attributed to the ‘depoliticization’ of
decision-making (Nicolaidis and Egan, 2001, p. 463) may be seen as an alarm
signal. Hence, should citizens fear a virtually uncontrolled technocracy?
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Answering these questions requires exploration of the day-to-day operation
of the regulatory scheme. For this purpose, we examine in the following the
elaboration and operation of two important directives that regulate safety of
machinery and toys, respectively. While the former generally fulfils the prom-
ises of legitimate regulation, the latter points to difficulties that jeopardize
legitimacy.
III. Legitimate Technical Regulation under the Machinery Directive
The legitimacy of technical regulation depends on the absence of opportuni-
ties of participating actors for bargaining at the two levels of decision-
making. Under the model institutional arrangement, we can expect that the
actors involved in upper (political) level decision-making are deprived of their
bargaining opportunities because their task is limited to elaborating general
rules applicable to a broader class of products and implemented elsewhere.
Therefore, we look for open conflicts that might reflect diverging interests.
Likewise, we can expect that the decision-makers of the lower (implementa-
tion) level are deprived of their bargaining power if they have clear substan-
tive guidance and are subject to an accountability system that effectively
binds them to this guidance and strictly limits the room for discrete choice.
Again, we take open conflict as an indicator for divergence of interests that
may reflect an attempt to bargain. We will conclude that an institutional
arrangement is capable of inducing even powerful stakeholders to engage in
deliberative decision-making, if we do not find opportunities for bargaining,
or if bargaining attempts fail due to the limits established by the arrangement.
Governance Approach and Elaboration of the Machinery Directive
The Machinery Directive1 provides clear guidance for the subsequent elabo-
ration of European standards. It requires machinery to be placed on the
market and put into service only if, when properly installed and maintained
and used for its intended purpose, it does not endanger the health or safety of
persons and domestic animals or property (art. 2.1). Accordingly, every
accident beyond clear misuse indicates a possible violation, although the
Directive implicitly acknowledges that absolute safety cannot be attained by
technical means, because some machinery is inherently dangerous. Moreover,
producers are committed to taking ‘the state of the art’ into account when
designing and constructing machinery with the purpose of approaching
the objectives of the Directive (annex I, sec. 2). This is a high hurdle for
1 Council Directive 89/392/EEC on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to
Machinery (OJ L 183 [1989], pp. 9–32).
INSTITUTIONAL STIMULATION OF DELIBERATIVE DECISION-MAKING 1011
© 2008 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
producers because it includes, besides the acknowledged rules for accident
prevention, new findings reflected in scientific publications or new patents
(Egan, 2001, p. 186). In addition, the Directive defines more specific safety
requirements addressing certain risks like technical hazards, fire or explosion.
Altogether, the Machinery Directive is recognised as the most sophisticated
regulation of common safety requirements under the New Approach.
Legislative documents reflect surprisingly few substantive conflicts among
the involved actors (Kerler, 2005a, pp. 232–40). The safety approach and its
explication in general clauses and the relatively precise annexes of the Direc-
tive were easily agreed upon. Moreover, the Directive was adopted within a
remarkable 18 months after submission by the Commission. Nevertheless,
three conflicts are of theoretical relevance for the argument developed here.
Southern countries sought exceptions from the high safety level and Denmark
aimed for clauses allowing more stringent national regulation.2 These
countries were able to identify specific interests across types of machinery.
However, their attempts to bargain failed, because opportunistic exceptions
would have jeopardized market integration based upon harmonized safety
standards. Moreover, France claimed that extremely dangerous machines
(e.g. for woodworking) ought to become subject to particularly high technical
safety standards, while other countries, such as Germany, rejected this claim
because of their training-based safety approach. Again, countries were able to
infer preferences across cases and attempted to transfer their diverging
domestic regulatory approaches to the European level. This conflict was
difficult to settle by arguments alone. Eventually, France succeeded due to a
previous decision by the ECJ that enabled it to uphold its stringent national
standards.3
Legislation of the Directive confirms our expectation that the elaboration
of general standards applicable to many products significantly reduces oppor-
tunities for bargaining. The few conflicts demonstrate that the Member States
consider technical regulation to be highly important and meriting the pursuit
of parochial interests. At stake are workers’ and consumers’ health and safety
interests as well as the competitiveness of domestic industries. All the more
remarkable are both the extremely low number of conflicts in the broad area
addressed by the Directive and the mode of their settlement, especially
regarding the rejection of exemptions. Hence, the participating actors in fact
largely avoided bargaining and engaged in a deliberative common search for
problem-adequate rules.
2 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, OJ C 1988, 31/12/1988, p. 32; EP Report of Proceedings
24/5/1989 [2-378], p. 154; EP Report of Proceedings 15/11/1988 [2-371], pp. 98–100.
3 Commission vs. French Republic, 1986, Case 8/74 ECR, p. 419.
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Standardization under the Machinery Directive
While the highly differentiated procedure for the elaboration of European
standards is designed to foster the deliberative exchange of arguments, it
cannot totally exclude bargaining among national standardization organiza-
tions. Within the most relevant body for machinery, i.e. the Comité Européen
de Normalization (CEN), the initial draft of the standard is normally elabo-
rated by a Working Group of limited size that takes into account interests of
manufactures, users, consumers and standardization bodies. Draft standards
are distributed to all national standardization organizations for comments. As
amended in response to the comments, they are adopted by the General
Assembly. A draft can be rejected by a majority of votes, but negative votes
must be accompanied by reasons (see CEN, 2008). Two additional arrange-
ments make bargaining more difficult. National standardization organizations
can appeal against decisions of CEN bodies in case of a violation of CEN
Internal Regulations. To avoid conflict with the public oversight actors, drafts
are cross-checked, as to their compatibility with the legally binding require-
ments of the Directive, by a consultant.
Legitimacy concerns might emerge from the widespread inactivity of the
formally established public oversight system. Formally, European standard-
ization is under strict control by the public actors to provide additional
incentives for problem-adequate standardization, and preclude unconvincing
‘deals’ among technical experts. However, elaborated standards are usually
registered by the Commission merely upon formal control of their confor-
mity with procedural and mandate-requirements after consultation of the
Committee on Standards, whose responsibility extends to technical harmo-
nization under all New Approach directives. Moreover, mandates for the
drafting of new standards are frequently elaborated by the standardization
bodies themselves and merely approved by the Commission. Hence, there is
no systematic ‘police-patrol’ oversight (Pollack, 2003, p. 42) of every single
standard. The de facto inactivity of the public actors threatens to increase
the room for discrete choice during elaboration of standards by private
actors.
De facto oversight relies on the safeguard procedure that may be invoked
by Member States against a standard that is deemed to be incompatible with
safety rules of the directive. In this case, the public actors examine in detail,
especially within the Standing Committee on Machinery established under
the Directive, whether the contested standard violates the requirements of the
Directive. Since problem-inadequate or poorly elaborated standards will be
rapidly challenged by a Member State, the standardization bodies always
operate in the shadow of ex post appraisal by the public actors, and of possible
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rejection of their output. Safeguard proceedings will thus point to legitimacy
deficits of the whole regulatory procedure if the underlying conflicts cannot
be settled satisfactorily. The very limited number of safeguard proceedings
indicates a low level of conflict between the standardization organizations and
the public oversight actors. Until 2002, only ten safeguard proceedings
against the altogether more than 600 standards under the Machinery Directive
had been initiated by interested countries (Stefanova, 2005a, p. 271).
The evaluation of a number of critical cases that stayed on the agendas of
the committees for several sessions (indicating that they were difficult to
solve) demonstrates that national preferences exist, while it is almost impos-
sible to impose a bargaining logic on the standardization process (Stefanova,
2005b). In the machinery sector, safeguard proceedings are predominantly
employed to draw attention to deficits of existing standards and thus help
improve the quality of existing regulation. The safeguard procedure may be
invoked as a means to discipline the standardization body and accelerate an
already on-going revision process. Italy drew the attention of CEN and of the
public oversight actors to the fact that the European standard on silage-
cutters (standard EN 703) did not prevent farmers from serious injury or
death when being drawn into the machine. It was able to mobilize near-
consensus against the standard (Committee on Standards, 2000b). Registra-
tion was withdrawn and a mandate for its revision adopted (OJ L 286 [2000],
p. 40). Safeguard proceedings are also initiated after objections have been
ignored during the standardization process. The United Kingdom drew atten-
tion to its safety concerns regarding soil-working machines that plough the
soil with rotating blades to deploy seeds (standard EN 708). Contacts with
parts of these machines could cause severe injury. Upon informal consulta-
tions within the Machinery Committee Directive, CEN initiated the revision
of the standard.
In contrast, it is difficult to employ the procedure to promote unconvincing
claims. Denmark contested a new standard on portable chainsaws for one-
hand use (standard EN ISO 11681-2). It claimed that the risk of severe
accidents was not sufficiently abolished by technical means, but it was not
able to substantiate that the risk of accidents inherent in these machines could
be mitigated by additional technical requirements, and it also did not seek a
total ban of the chainsaws. Although the Committee admitted that the type of
machinery was extremely dangerous, the conflict was ended only by a vote
after about 18 months of discussion within the two committees involved and
with CEN. Ten countries present and voting supported the Commission
proposal to keep the norm and request that CEN examine additional precau-
tionary measures, while Denmark and the UK voted against it (Committee on
Standards, 2000a). Although this conflict was not solved by an exchange of
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convincing arguments alone, the Committee decision reflected the most
convincing proposition.
In conclusion, we did not find evidence that regulation under the Machin-
ery Directive fails to mobilize, even in contentious cases, the sort of politi-
cally guided technocratic legitimacy that we expected to emerge from the
institutional arrangement. Both the rarity of safeguard proceedings and their
treatment suggest that occasional conflict contributes to improving the quality
of European standards, while the standards are sufficiently well protected
against unconvincing claims by Member States. Safeguard proceedings in the
machinery sector are successful only if the respective initiators manage to
draw attention to severe safety problems. For this purpose, they must provide
extensive documentation of accidents and indicate how the problems in
question might be remedied. While the actors involved do not always delib-
erate, as is demonstrated by the last-mentioned conflict, results reflect a
deliberative rationale.
IV. Legitimacy Gaps in the Regulation of Toys
The Toy Safety Directive constitutes a hard case for the hypothesis of insti-
tutionally induced deliberation under the New Approach, because toy safety
has been subject to political tension and several publicly recognised conflicts,
which reappear in the current revision process of the Directive.
Governance Approach and Elaboration of the Toy Safety Directive
The Toy Safety Directive4 provides much less reliable general guidance for
standardization decision-makers than the Machinery Directive. Generally,
toys shall not jeopardize the safety and/or health of users when used as
intended in a foreseeable way, bearing in mind the normal behaviour of
children (art. 2.1). Remaining risk must be commensurate with the ability of
the users to cope with it (annex II, sec. I. 2a). Whereas the Machinery
Directive is automatically adapted to technical progress through the ‘state of
the art’ requirement, the Toy Safety Directive is not. It provides the standard-
ization decision-makers with an increased discretion, e.g. when determining
the ability of users to handle risks.
Regulatory gaps that can be attributed to divergent interests during legis-
lation exist, especially regarding specific risks. Some well-known risks are
not addressed at all by the specific safety requirements of the Directive. The
4 Council Directive 88/378/EEC on the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Concerning the
Safety of Toys (OJ L 187 [1988], pp. 1–13; amended by Council Directive 93/68/EEC (OJ L 220 [1993],
pp. 1–22.
INSTITUTIONAL STIMULATION OF DELIBERATIVE DECISION-MAKING 1015
© 2008 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
legislative actors deliberately side-stepped conflicts on the appropriate regu-
lation and assigned their settlement to the standardization process. Documen-
tation of the legislative process reveals a number of disputes about the
inclusion of more specific requirements concerning particular risks, such as
those originating from electrical toys, from noise, or from certain chemicals.5
Based upon their domestic regulatory approaches toward toy safety, Member
States were apparently capable of identifying uniform interests on these risks
across groups of toys. Moreover, countries with toy industries and the Com-
mission struggled to avoid all too detailed regulation in order to reach rapid
agreement on the Directive. In stark contrast, other risks are excessively
regulated, for example, by setting exact limits for the bio-availability of
non-organic chemicals like mercury, cadmium, and arsenic.
Gaps in the regulation of specific risks undermine functional differentia-
tion between the two levels involved and have been identified as obstacles for
problem-adequate regulation during the current review of the Directive. The
lack of general safety requirements transfers the workload related to these
risks almost entirely, i.e. without guidance beyond the general clauses, to the
standardization process, and enlarges the room available for bargaining.
Commission consultants pointed to these regulatory gaps (Risks and Policy
Analysts Ltd., 2004, p. 42) and stakeholders generally support stricter regu-
lation (Commission, 2007, pp. 6–7; Europe Economics, 2007).
Standardization under the Toys Safety Directive
Compared to the Machinery Directive, the Toy Safety Directive currently
provides significantly more opportunities for bargaining and missing political
guidance has not been systematically compensated for. Discourse theory
suggests that missing decision-criteria might be elaborated within the stan-
dardization process, but this must occur separately from their application to
specific cases. Whereas general A- and B-standards provide additional guid-
ance for the development of specific C-standards in the machinery sector,
standards in the toy sector are not hierarchically ordered and their number is
very small. Currently, only nine toy standards are in force.6 Four of them
address small groups of particularly dangerous toys (experimental sets for
chemistry; other chemical toy sets; finger paints; and swings for domestic
use). The rest are devoted to unspecific risks (mechanical and physical
properties; flammability; migration of certain components like heavy metals;
graphical symbols for age warning labelling; and safety of electric toys) and
5 See, for example, Legislative Resolution of the European Parliament, OJ C 246, 9/7/1987; Opinion of the
Economic and Social Committee, OJ C 323, 31/8/1987.
6 OJ C 232 [2007], pp. 23–4; OJ C 56 [2006], p. 3.
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are valid for all kinds of toys. These standards combine general rules and very
detailed provisions applicable to small groups of products. Accordingly, such
standards do not exclude that packages are put together when national stan-
dardization organizations struggle to transfer their national safety concepts to
the European level (Egan, 2001, p. 176).
The lasting conflict about noise from toy pistols demonstrates that lacking
general guidance may lead to fierce battles among actors (Kerler, 2005b, pp.
336–47). In July 1998, CEN submitted for the first time, as part of a revised
standard concerning the mechanical and physical properties of toys (EN
71-1), noise limits for toy pistols. Noise levels should not exceed 140dB peak
during a transitional period of three years, and 125dB afterwards. Noise was
to be measured at a distance of 50cm from the ear, so that pistols conforming
to the standard might create as much as 160dB noise if fired at a distance of
5cm from a child’s ear. Apparently, the proposed values reflect more a
bargaining compromise in light of producers’ interests than a deliberative
agreement on the health and safety demand of children. Germany invoked
safeguard proceedings, and the Commission rejected, upon request by the
Committee on Standards and the Commission’s Expert Group on Toy Safety,
the registration of the disputed part of the new standard. During the necessary
revision process, the national standardization organizations were deeply
divided on the issue. A CEN draft standard envisaging 120dB was rejected by
votes of the majority of member organizations. The eventually adopted stan-
dard envisages 134dB, i.e. the figure that just gained support by a minimum
winning coalition (Fiala, 2000, p. 26). This standard was once again rejected
by the public oversight actors.7 Instead, the original standard with its com-
paratively low limit of 125dB after expiry of the transitional period was
accepted, while the conformity assumption was created only after this period
had expired.8 Even though the Member States and the Commission eventually
thwarted the standardization body’s intention to enact overly high noise
limits, the finally adopted limit still reflected a bargaining compromise rather
than being inferred from the Directive’s safety requirements.
The conflict over softeners (phthalates) contained in baby teething rings
demonstrates that the standardization apparatus, in the absence of clear guid-
ance, may face long-term stalemate due to principled disagreement over the
appropriate safety approach (Kerler, 2005b, pp. 348–56). It took CEN nearly
two decades to submit the first standards on the subject in 20059 – and
registration is still pending. Due to the lasting stalemate, the problem of
7 Expert Group on Toys, ENTR/TOYS/2001/027, March 9, 2001.
8 See OJ L 205 [2001].
9 See ‘Organic Chemical Compounds – Requirements’, EN 71-9; ‘Sample Preparation’, EN 71-10; and
‘Methods of Analysis’, EN 71-11.
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softeners in baby teething rings had to be regulated outside the Toys Safety
Directive. In the absence of specific product requirement, some Member
States had banned certain toys from their markets while others remained
inactive. To ensure a consistent approach among all Member States, the
Commission issued, under the Product Safety Directive, a ban for certain
chemicals in toys that had to be renewed every three months.10 In 2005, the
EU finally banned certain chemicals under an amendment to the Directive on
Dangerous Substances and Preparations.11
The difficulties observed in some areas of toy safety regulation demon-
strate that delegation of decision-making competencies to non-state technical
experts gathered in CEN, or to experts of Member States’ administrations,
does not per se ensure deliberative problem-solving. If decision-makers enjoy
discretion, bargaining might ensue. Accordingly, institutional stimulation of
deliberation requires that technical experts receive clear guidance as to soci-
ety’s general acceptance of risks. The difficulties observed at the implemen-
tation level may thus be attributed to a deficient regulation at the upper
(political) level. If the legislative actors side-step conflict over the general
regulatory approach, they undermine the division of labour between the two
levels of decision-making and remove the most important incentive for
deliberation at the lower (operational) level.
Conclusion
Collectively binding decisions may be considered legitimate if they emerge
from deliberation, or if they are based upon a deliberative rationale. Their
legitimacy is based upon the fact that they have evolved as the most convinc-
ing solutions from discursive exchanges of reasonable arguments. To create
legitimacy, a deliberation must consider all possibly convincing arguments
that might have an impact on the collective decision, but it does not neces-
sarily have to include all those possibly affected by the decision. Deliberative
legitimacy will be undermined if the decision is influenced by resources other
than reasonable arguments, such as threats, promises, and package deals or
other forms of horsetrading. It is all too often forgotten that any assessment of
the deliberative legitimacy of real-world decisions requires an analysis of
whether these decisions actually reflect the deliberative rationale.
Deliberative legitimacy can arise from two different forms of deliberation
that are frequently not sufficiently well separated from each other, namely
political and technical deliberation. Political deliberation addresses the
10 Commission Decision 815/EC, OJ L 315 [1999], pp. 46–9.
11 See Directive 2005/84/EC; OJ L 344 [2005], pp. 40–3.
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broader issues of how a society wants to organize itself. It is subject to
comparatively few formal restrictions and draws its legitimacy from its inclu-
siveness and from its transparency. Within the political system of the EU, it is
relevant in the constitutional (treaty-making) and legislative processes. Tech-
nical deliberation addresses the narrower issues of how a given goal is best
achieved. It is subject to much clearer guidance that stems, ideally, from
political deliberation. It does not draw its legitimacy from openness and
transparency, but from the competence and expertise of its (possibly only
few) participants. Neither of these two forms of deliberative legitimacy is
superior to the other, because they are complementary to each other. Experts
cannot assume responsibility for defining the goals of society without trans-
forming deliberative democracy into technocratic authoritarianism. Likewise,
the broader public cannot assume responsibility for defining the specific
safety requirements of chainsaws or for deciding upon the authorization of
pharmaceuticals without creating undesired side-effects and grossly reducing
the quality of regulation.
Complex decision-making arrangements can stimulate legitimate delib-
erative decision-making if they systematically separate the two tasks to be
fulfilled in a deliberation, namely the definition of the broader lines of
governance and their specification in concrete situations. Due to the demand-
ing prerequisites, it cannot simply be assumed that powerful actors voluntar-
ily sacrifice benefits only in order to allow problem-adequate results to
emerge. To stimulate deliberative decision-making systematically, an institu-
tional arrangement has to hinder actors from introducing their bargaining
resources into the negotiation process. Separation of these two decision
functions introduces a division of labour that promises to deprive stakehold-
ers both at the political and at the technical level, partially or entirely, from
their ability to bargain.
This arrangement is reflected in the New Approach to technical harmo-
nization within the single market, which assigns the function of determining
general health and safety requirements to the legislator and the function of
specifying these requirements for products and groups of products to a
multi-step standardization procedure. It is also present in other areas of
single market policy. The regulation of the health and safety requirements
for machinery in the single market demonstrates that an appropriately
designed institutional arrangement can actually hinder stakeholders from
bargaining. In stark contrast to the difficulties experienced with the original
approach of full harmonization of limited sectors of machinery before the
New Approach, legislation was almost free of conflict over specific health
and safety requirements. The elaborate safety concept of the Directive pro-
vides firm guidance for the standardization process and sharply delimits
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available discretion. The analysis of some critical cases shows that the
public actors involved are disciplined by the arrangement and cannot easily
resort to bargaining, while the procedure provides public actors (namely the
Member States) with an opportunity to effectively contest unconvincing
standards.
The institutional incentives for deliberative decision-making will diminish
if the division of labour between the political and the technical level fails.
During the preparation of the Toy Safety Directive, the legislative actors did
not manage to overcome their divergent views on all relevant issues. Some
conflicts were side-stepped and left entirely to the standardization process. As
a consequence, the private and public actors operating at the operational level
lack guidance. Their discretion is not as clearly delimited as necessary, and
the mechanism of functional differentiation has not become as effective as in
the field of machinery. In line with our theoretical expectation, bargaining is
therefore more easily reintroduced into the decision process, because stake-
holders are able to define their parochial interests and dispose of the neces-
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